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Abstract: This is a reply to the comments by Corver, Doetjes, Link, Piñón,
Schwarzschild, and Syrett on the target article in this volume, Stratified refer-
ence: The common core of distributivity, aspect, and measurement. Stratified
reference is designed to capture semantic oppositions involving atelicity, plur-
ality and mass reference, extensive measure functions, distributivity, and col-
lectivity. Following suggestions by some of the commentators, stratified
reference is refined here in two ways: it is restricted to the parts of the event
or individual in question, and its granularity parameter is instantiated with a
predicate built around mereological proper parthood and degree ordering.
Keywords: algebraic semantics, aspect, boundedness, collectivity, distributivity,
mass, measurement, mereology, monotonicity, plural, partitives, telicity
1 Introduction
This paper continues the discussion about my target article, Stratified reference:
The common core of distributivity, aspect, and measurement (Champollion, this
volume). I am grateful and honored to receive the insightful comments by Norbert
Corver, Jenny Doetjes, Godehard Link, Christopher Piñón, Roger Schwarzschild,
and Kristen Syrett. I very much appreciate the contributions by Corver (this
volume) on the bounded-unbounded opposition in syntax, and by Syrett (this
volume) on the interpretation of all and each in child language. It is highly
encouraging to see that stratified reference may help shed light on empirical
domains quite distinct from those for which it was designed. However, I will limit
myself to addressing those comments that I feel competent as a semanticist to
address in print, namely the ones by Doetjes, Link, Piñón, and Schwarzschild.
After replying to these comments in Sections 2 through 5, I will refine the
analysis described in the target article in Section 6. Building on proposals by
Piñón and Schwarzschild, I will:
– restrict stratified reference to the parts of the event or individual in ques-
tion, in order to prevent it from making universal claims affecting unrelated
entities, and
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– instantiate its granularity parameter with a predicate built around
mereological proper parthood and degree ordering instead of the predi-
cate εðKÞ.
These modifications preserve the explanatory power of stratified reference
as a higher-order property that is parametrized for dimension and granularity,
and that can be used to link theories across the empirical domains of distribu-
tivity, aspect, and measurement. I believe that the technical underpinnings of
the theory have been strengthened as a result of the constructive criticism
offered by the commentators. For this I am indebted to the commentators, and
to the editors of this journal who provided a forum for this debate.
2 Reply to Doetjes
Doetjes (this volume) observes that stratified reference does not rule out
incremental-theme verbs whose themes are downward-entailing modified
numerals, such as (1a). It has this problem in common with the subinterval
property, which it is meant to generalize. Cumulative reference does not fare
any better because an analogous problem occurs with upward-entailing mod-
ified numerals (1b). She therefore proposes combining stratified reference with
cumulative reference, following Landman and Rothstein (2012). This will rule
out both types of examples out as desired, but unfortunately not (1c), dis-
cussed by Zucchi and White (2001).
(1) a. #He drank at most thirty glasses of water for three hours.
b. #He finished at least three books for three hours.
c. #John drank {some/a quantity of} milk for an hour.
This kind of behavior is puzzling for most if not all algebraic theories of aspect,
including mine. The noun phrases in (1) seem to behave for the purposes of
these theories as if they were quantized. An early feature-based theory of
aspectual composition, Verkuyl (1972), grouped modified and unmodified
numerals together by assigning both of them a feature [þSPECIFIED QUANTITY],
while bare plurals and mass nouns carried the feature [SPECIFIED QUANTITY].
Algebraic notions like quantization, stratified reference, and the subinterval
property are meant to make such features superfluous. But in noun phrases
like the ones in (1), the effects of these two systems come apart (Verkuyl 2005,
fn. 3). A similar issue is discussed by Schwarzschild (this volume) in connec-
tion with the word line. Other problematic predicates include twig, rock, and
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sequence. A helpful but ultimately inconclusive discussion of possible ways to
address this problem is found in Zucchi and White (2001).
Doetjes correctly observes that some examples involving measure phrases
can be ruled out for reasons that are unrelated to the aspectual sensitivity of the
for-adverbial. For example, we cannot use a measure phrase that is not large
enough to include a minimal event:
(2) #The recipe passed on from generation to generation for thirty years.
Doetjes suggests that from generation to generation entails that there are more than
one or two generations, too much to fit into a thirty-year timespan (Zwarts 2013). If
so, it is not the stratified-reference constraint of the for-phrase that makes (2) odd,
but the mismatch between the measure phrase and the length of the shortest event
that could be denoted by the predicate. I agree that this is a reasonable explanation
for the oddness of (2). Similarly, (3a) (repeated from (48a) in the target article) not
only violates stratified reference, we would also expect it to be infelicitous anyway
because it would require the speaker to know that there is just a single twelve-
pound weight. And Doetjes’ example (3b) is not a felicitous way to describe a
number of boxes that the speaker knows contain one twelve-pound weight each.
(3) a. *twelve pounds of twelve-pound weights
b. Each of these boxes contains twelve pounds of weights.
Doetjes links this speaker-knowledge effect to a similar constraint on event-
related readings of numerals.
A different problem for the account in the article arises because, as Doetjes
notes, (3b) can be used to describe boxes that each contain one weight of ten
pounds and two weights of one pound. The problem is that a ten-pound weight
is not very small compared to twelve pounds, as we would expect due to the use
of εðKÞ. In response to this problem and similar considerations by other com-
mentators, I will replace εðKÞ by a weaker condition (see Section 6).
One might wonder if the only thing that for-adverbials require is that the
measure phrase is large enough to contain a minimal entity described by the
relevant predicate. The following examples show that aspectual sensitivity still
plays a role, however.
(4) a. John walked a mile in/*for twenty minutes.
b. The courier ran from Marathon to Athens in/*for three hours.
Iterativity aside, any event described by a motion predicate with a quantized
path will be minimal, so the minimal-entity constraint would not rule out them
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out by itself. The stratified-reference constraint, by contrast, rules them out, and
thereby makes sure that we cannot use for- and in-adverbials interchangeably.
3 Reply to Link
Stratified reference as originally formulated involves distributivity over events or
individuals. Link (this volume)1 shows that at least for the temporal case, its
effect can also be achieved via universal quantification over subintervals.
Link and I share the same general outlook on the usefulness of mereology in
natural language semantics, but he raises doubts about the way in which the
value of the granularity parameter is determined in the target article. While I
made it dependent on the measure phrase provided by the for-adverbial or
pseudopartitive (e.g. ten minutes), he suggests that it should be governed by
the predicate at issue (e.g. waltz). To this end, he associates every event property
P with a temporal threshold δP. This threshold supplies the minimum duration
for an event to be meaningfully called a P event.
The purpose for which I used the granularity parameter was not to describe the
length of the smallest events that count as waltzing, but to describe the require-
ments that for-adverbials impose on the properties they modify. If a for-adverbial is
like a sieve and the waltzing events are like grains of sand, the system in the target
article is not concerned with describing the size of the grains, but the size of the
holes in the sieve. (The target article assumes that the holes of the sievemust be very
small as comparedwith themeasure phrase. Link notes that they can be of the same
order of magnitude, as in his The production of Airbus A380 at a rate of three per
month has been going on for half a year now. I come back to this point in Section 6.)
When we combine two for-adverbials with the same predicate, as shown in
(5), the two for-adverbials correspond to sieves with different hole sizes (see also
Doetjes’ comment for related discussion).
(5) The recipe was passed on from generation to generation...
a. ...for thousands of years.
b. ...#for thirty years.
To capture this contrast, the granularity parameter cannot be determined exclu-
sively with reference to the predicate, but must involve the time span described
1 Link’s seminal work on algebraic semantics, compiled in Link (1998), has been one of the
major influences for the target article and the dissertation on which it is based, Champollion
(2010). It is a great honor for me to read and reply to his comments in these pages.
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by the for-adverbial – either directly as I did it in the article, or indirectly via the
temporal trace of the main event, as I will do in Section 6.
With that said, stratified reference can certainly also be used to describe the
size of the grains of sand. For example, the size of a minimal waltzing event is
not determined by any for-adverbials, although it will influence the ability of
different for-adverbials to combine with waltz. If we were to formulate a mean-
ing postulate stating that waltz has stratified reference down to a certain gran-
ularity, then indeed we might want to use a threshold function such as δP to
determine that granularity. In fact, I have tacitly assumed such meaning postu-
lates at various places in the article. Wherever I state that a stratified-reference
presupposition is satisfied by a verb phrase, a more complete formalization of
the theory would derive that fact from meaning postulates and other means of
capturing the formal properties of that verb phrase (cf. Krifka 1998).
For further discussion of the granularity parameter, see my reply to Piñón
and Section 6. The remainder of this reply is concerned with Link’s analysis of
stratified reference.
Link approximates stratified reference in several steps. His first step, in (6),
assumes a function δ that maps events and intervals to degrees representing
their durations, which are totally ordered by . The parthood relation between
events is written v.
(6) "e"l PðeÞ ^ δP  l  δðeÞ ! 9e0 v e ðPðe0Þ ^ δðe0Þ ¼ lÞð Þ (SIP)
(Let e be a P event and l some duration at least as long as the temporal
threshold associated with P but not longer than e. Then there is a subevent
e0 of e which is also a P and has duration l.)
While SIP avoids the minimal parts problem, Link notes that it requires the
events in P have a dense structure. This is too strong an ontological assumption.
Another problem, which Link does not mention, is that SIP applies not only to
atelic predicates but also arguably to certain telic predicates. For example, if any
sufficiently long final subinterval of the runtime of a walk to the store event
qualifies as walking to the store, then walk to the store has SIP.
This problem is avoided by the formulation in (7), which exempts too-short
subintervals from the universal quantifier. Here, 4 stands for the inclusion
relation between temporal intervals:
(7) "e"t PðeÞ ^ t 4 τðeÞ ^ δðtÞ  δP ! 9e0 v e ðPðe0Þ ^ τðe0Þ ¼ tÞð Þ (SIP*)
(Let e be a P event. Every time span t located within the trace of e whose
duration is at least δP is the trace of some subevent e0 which is also a P.)
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As Link notes, this runs into another problem. Take the atelic predicate swim
laps. Suppose that John swims several laps in succession starting at 1 pm,
one lap per minute. Then δ½½swim laps ¼ 1 min, assuming that laps literally
means one or more laps. Now if he starts each lap on the full minute, there
will be no lap from 1:00:30 pm to 1:01:30 pm, and so there will be no event
at that time that qualifies as swim laps. Therefore (7) does not hold of the
property denoted by swim laps.
Note that by cumulativity, there is a swim laps event that takes from
1:00:00 pm to 1:02:00 pm. While its runtime is not equal to the time interval
from 1:00:30 pm to 1:01:30 pm, it contains that interval and not much more. This
leads to Link’s final formulation, which I take to be (8).
(8) "e"t½PðeÞ ^ t 4 τðeÞ ^ δðtÞ  δP !
9e0 v e ðPðe0Þ ^ t 4 τðe0Þ ^ ðδðτðe0ÞÞ  δðtÞÞ  2δPÞ (SIP**)
(Let e be a P event. Every time span t which is located within the trace of e
and whose duration is at least δP is located within the trace of some
subevent e0 of e which is also a P and whose duration exceeds that of t
by at most twice δP.)
SIP** quantifies over parts of an interval and then relates these parts to
suitable events or entities, while stratified reference distributes down to
parts of an event or entity and uses intervals or degrees to make sure that
these parts are small enough. In the temporal domain, as Link shows, the two
different routes lead essentially to the same result, and SIP** comes very close
in effect to stratified reference. Whether this means that SIP** is as easily
adaptable to other domains as stratified reference remains to be seen. Due to
the way SIP** relies on the specifics of time, generalizing it across domains is
not straightforward. In (8), there is a distinction between temporal intervals
such as t and their durations δðtÞ. Temporal intervals are individuated and
more fine-grained than durations. Two events can have different runtimes
but the same duration, as is the case for a one-hour-long event today and
another one-hour-long event yesterday. There is no such distinction in degree-
based domains like weight and temperature, and so it is not entirely clear how
to reformulate SIP** in a way that applies to pseudopartitives like five pounds
of cherries—certainly not if weights and temperatures are degrees in the
ordinary sense (totally ordered entities). The differences may become smaller,
and a condition such as SIP** more easily generalizable, if we adopt a
nonstandard conception of weights and temperatures as partially ordered
entities or tropes, so that they become more similar to temporal intervals
(cf. Moltmann 2009).
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4 Reply to Piñón
Stratified reference is designed to generate new hypotheses and predictions by
supplying a common core that brings various theories and empirical domains
together. Piñón (this volume) suggests that this common core “may be more
illusory than real”. He sees stratified reference as neither sufficiently specified
nor sufficiently motivated, and argues that it can and should be replaced by a
combination of two properties built around proper parthood and extensive
measure functions. Piñón’s position is informed by the hypothesis that the
semantics of aspect, measurement, and distributivity does not make reference
to smallness. Accordingly, one of his main concerns with stratified reference is
its reliance on the formula εðKÞðxÞ, which I have paraphrased as “x is very small
with respect to K”.
It is not clear to me how to apply categories like reality and illusion to
theoretical constructs. I agree that these constructs must be fully specified and
well-motivated, though. In Section 6, I show how to reconcile Piñón’s no-smallness
hypothesis with the proposal in the target article by adopting a version of stratified
reference that does not rely on ε. Here, I critically review Piñón’s own proposal,
which he describes as a simple and weak property that is meant to cover much of
the same empirical ground as stratified reference.
Piñón defines this property, which he calls divided reference, as in (9). Here,
y o z means that y and z are disjoint (that is, they do not have any part in
common). The symbol G stands for the mereological proper-part relation.
(9) Divided reference
DR ðPÞðxÞ ¼def 9y9zðyG x ^ zG x ^ y o z ^ ðy¯ zÞ ¼ x ^ PðyÞ ^ PðzÞÞ
(x consists of two disjoint parts that are each in P.)
Given the axioms of classical extensional mereology, the subformula yG x ^ zG x
is entailed by y o z ^ ðy¯ zÞ ¼ x, so it can be dropped from the definition without
changing its meaning. Alternatively, one could drop the disjointness condition
y o z (it does not play a central role in Piñón’s account). Unlike the previous
change, this does result in a different property, one that is even weaker than (9).
While stratified reference quantifies over all of the entities in the extension of
the relevant predicate, divided reference is restricted to a single entity. I agree
with Piñón that this is a useful move, and with the reasons he gives for it (it
avoids making universal claims about unrelated entities). Schwarzschild makes
some of the same observations as Piñón and shows how stratified reference can
also be restricted to a single entity, while keeping its essential properties—the
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dimension and granularity parameters and the ability to link domains—along with
the explanatory power that they provide. See Section 6 for further discussion.
Divided reference cannot cover the same ground as stratified reference,
mainly because it lacks dimension and granularity parameters. Section 4 of the
target article shows that all and each behave differently with respect to distribu-
tive and collective predicates, and suggests that this is because their granularity
parameters have different settings. Each accepts only distributive predicates
because it requires distribution to events with atomic participants such as smil-
ing events, while all also accepts certain collective predicates because it merely
requires distribution to events with small but potentially nonatomic numbers of
participants, such as gathering events. The same core idea can also be brought to
bear on the difference between atomic and nonatomic covert distributivity
operators and on the behavior of indefinites in the scope of for-adverbials
(Champollion 2015a), as well as on the crosslinguistic difference between atomic
and nonatomic adnominal distance-distributive items, such as English each and
German jeweils (Champollion 2015b). Divided reference is not well-suited for any
of these purposes because it lacks a granularity parameter.
All this is perhaps not problematic from Piñón’s perspective given his doubts
that stratified reference can shed light on issues raised by distributivity and
collectivity. However, the lack of a dimension parameter also has consequences
in the domains of aspect and measurement. Divided reference cannot account for
differences between temporal and spatial aspect because it does not make refer-
ence to time or space (see the discussion around Figure 1 in the target article):
(10) a. John pushed carts all the way to the store for fifty minutes.
b. John pushed carts all the way to the store for fifty meters.
Stratified reference provides a natural account of why these two sentences differ
in meaning. The for-adverbials set the dimension parameter to two different
values, namely τ (temporal trace) for (10a) and σ (spatial extent) for (10b).
In the domain of measurement, Piñón admits that divided reference cannot be
used to distinguish betweenpairs of pseudopartitiveswith the same substance noun:
(11) a. three inches of water
b. *three degrees Celsius of water
Stratified reference is satisfied in (11a) because every amount of water can be
divided into amounts of water with smaller heights or diameters than the whole,
but not in (11b) because the parts of any amount of water do not have a lower
temperature than the whole. Divided reference is satisfied whenever the amount
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of water in question is large enough to consist of two disjoint parts which are also
water. This criterion does not distinguish between (11a) and (11b). Piñón recog-
nizes the need for a separate constraint and suggests that pseudopartitives only
accept extensive measure functions, following Krifka (1989). This is one of the
notions that stratified reference is designed to formalize and subsume, so Piñón
and I agree at some level. Still, there are differences between Krifka’s formaliza-
tion and mine. For presentational purposes, I have slightly condensed and
adapted the following definition from Krifka (1989, 1998). Here,  is mereological
parthood, þ is arithmetic sum, and > is the arithmetic greater-than relation.
(12) Definition: Extensive measure function
Let ^ (a “concatenation”) be an associative and commutative but non-
idempotent operation. A measure function µ is extensive on ^ iff for any a
and b that are disjoint, μðaÞ þ μðbÞ ¼ μða^bÞ, and for any c and d, if c  d
and μðdÞ>0 then μðcÞ>0.
In order for this definition to work correctly, it is critical that the “right” con-
catenation be used. The issue is analogous to the one I illustrated with five inches
of snow in the target article for a related proposal (Schwarzschild 2002, 2006).
Suppose for example that we use mereological sum restricted to disjoint entities,
as suggested by Krifka (1998). Height is not extensive on that concatenation. The
five inches of snow s that fell on Berlin are the sum (and therefore the concatena-
tion) of two disjoint parts, namely, the five inches of snow sa that fell on West
Berlin and the five inches of snow sb that fell on East Berlin. The arithmetic sum of
the heights of sa and of sb in inches is twice the height of s rather than equal to it.
Height is only extensive on a concatenation that requires a and b in (12) to range
over horizontal layers of snow, in which case sa and sb will be excluded. Krifka is
not explicit on the way his system selects a concatenation before checking if the
measure function of a given pseudopartitive is extensive on it, except that he
requires the pseudopartitive to denote a quantized predicate (Krifka 1989: 82). But
five inches of snow applies both to s and to its proper part sa, so it is not quantized.
This is not to say that it is impossible to formulate a more refined version of the
definition in (12) or the ones on which it is based. Quite the opposite: It was
among other things the attempt to do so that led me to stratified reference.
5 Reply to Schwarzschild
I focus here on just one of the many topics brought up in Schwarzschild (this
volume): the significance of temporal parts. Section 6 discusses two more,
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namely the restriction of stratified reference to the parts of the entity at hand
and the status of εðKÞ.
Concerning temporal parts, Schwarzschild observes that stratified reference
does not explain why the following sentences sound odd in the scenarios he
describes:
(13) a. ?Jack made pretzels for two feet. (i.e. a single two-foot peel)
b. ?The water cooled for 5 degrees instantaneously.
c. ?Jill crushed bamboo poles (instantaneously) for five square feet.
He suggests as a possible explanation that for the purpose of for-adverbials, the
only parts that an event has are temporal parts. Schwarzschild writes < for
mereological parthood and ` for the inclusion relation between time intervals.
(14) e′ < e ! duration(e′) ` duration(e)
This principle rules out the existence of two simultaneous events of which one is
a part of the other. Schwarzschild hypothesizes that all for-adverbials are tem-
poral and that what looks like non-temporal uses actually involves metaphoric
uses or nonce temporal measure phrases. While I cannot explain what is wrong
with the examples in (13), principle (14) is certainly too strong as stated. One
class of examples that it would wrongly rule out involves events which are
spatially extended across an area, similarly to (13c):
(15) Snow fell throughout the area for two straight days.2
(16) The flowering of the bamboo fascinated him. The bamboo flowers simul-
taneously for hundreds of miles. [...] The synchronicity of events fascinated
him [...].3
(17) The multiplicity of [a Chinese calligrapher’s] horizontal and vertical brush
strokes, and their unending possibilities may be likened to sudden thunder
and lightning which instantaneously flash for thousands of miles.4
(18) According to eyewitnesses, the ground was shaken for two miles around,
and even the galleys tied up in the harbors felt the explosions through
their wooden hulls.5
2 Attested example (http://community.lawyers.com/forums/t/17235.aspx).
3 Attested example (Seshadri and Visvanathan 2002: 2163).
4 Attested example (http://www.ngansiumui.com/about/about_pub_ebook-callig_en.html).
5 Attested example (http://www.historynet.com/the-guns-of-constantinople.htm).
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(19) [T]he police blocked streets for miles around [the museum].6
It is difficult to see the spatial for-adverbials in these examples as temporal for-
adverbials in disguise. Areas cannot easily serve as metaphoric descriptions of
temporal intervals, because a two-dimensional area cannot be mapped to a time
interval in any obvious way. The principle (14) would also be difficult to uphold in
any of these scenarios. For example, the event described by (15) may consist of
various two-day-long subevents that correspond to different spatial parts of the
area in question. By (14), these subevents would be required to have a shorter
duration than the entire event rather than being simultaneous to it.
Given these examples, it seems plausible that either time or space can be
encoded in a for-adverbial and that not all for-adverbials are temporal. In line
with the broader discussion on spatial aspect in Moltmann (1991) and Gawron
(2005), this provides motivation for the dimension parameter of stratified
reference.
6 Restricting stratified reference
Both Schwarzschild and Piñón make observations that relate to the universal
quantifier in stratified reference. Schwarzschild proposes a modification that
drops this quantifier while staying within the spirit of the original approach.
In the target article, I suggested that stratified reference rules out (20a)
because it generates the presupposition in (20b), which I took to be a presuppo-
sition failure.
(20) a. *five pounds of book
b. Every book can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is a
book that weighs a lot less than five pounds.
I said that this presupposition fails for two reasons: (i) typically, a book’s weight
is not very small compared with five pounds, so we cannot read the “one or
more parts” as “one part”; (ii) based on the assumption that entities in the
denotation of singular count nouns are atoms, a book does not consist of proper
parts which are themselves books, so we cannot read the “one or more parts” as
6 Attested example (Iraq museum that was looted reopens, far from whole, by Steven Lee Myers,
New York Times, February 24, 2009). With thanks to Cleo Condoravdi (p.c.)
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“two or more parts”. Schwarzschild and Piñón both note a problem in connec-
tion with (21).
(21) five pounds of books
My account predicts that (21) presupposes that every sum of one or more books
(and in particular, every book) can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is a book or sum of books x that weighs a lot less than five pounds. Now
whenever x is a sum of several books that weighs a lot less than five pounds,
each of these books will also weigh less than five pounds. As Piñón and
Schwarzschild note, this means that the presupposition of (21) boils down to
(20b). In other words, my account generates the same presuppositions for (20a)
and (21). Now since (21) is acceptable, if my stratified-reference account is
correct then (20b) cannot be a presupposition failure. But this means that either
(i) or (ii) must be false. Indeed I was wrong about (i). Five pounds are 80 ounces.
The average book weighs 12 ounces, and over 75% weigh under 24 ounces
(Weatherford and Manley 2002), which means that a book’s weight is typically
much smaller than 80 ounces. Now suppose that (ii) is true, and therefore (20b)
is true in the “two or more parts” sense. This amounts to (22):
(22) All books weigh a lot less than with five pounds.
If (22) is true, then (20a) will be ruled out because the intersection of the set of
books with the set of objects whose weight is five pounds is empty (see the
discussion around example (42) in the article, *five tons of book).
Although we can explain the difference between (20a) and (21), stratified
reference plays no role in explaining it. This should give us pause. There is also
another problem. As Schwarzschild puts it, “I can felicitously report that I’ve
bought 5 pounds of books without committing to something as strong as [(22)]. It
is sufficient that each of the books I’ve bought weighs less than 5 pounds.”
This problem arises from the way stratified reference incorporates a higher-
order property without relativizing it to a single individual or event. Schwarzschild
suggests addressing this problem by restricting stratified reference to the parts of
the individual or event in question. As he notes, this also simplifies my account of
examples (11a) and (11b) in the article involving John pushing carts to the store
because I no longer need to appeal to contextual restriction for this purpose. This
modification preserves what I take to be the central features of my approach,
namely the dimension and granularity parameters and the ability to link empirical
domains. Therefore I am happy to endorse it here. I repeat Schwarzschild’s
definition (4) here in slightly modified form in (23).
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(23) Restricted stratified reference
SR f ;g ¼def λPλx x2 λy
PðyÞ ^
gðf ðyÞÞ
  
(x consists of one or more parts in P that are each mapped by f to some-
thing in g.)
We may read SR f ;gðPÞðxÞ as “P stratifies x along dimension f with granularity g”.
The type of (23) is hαt; αti where α is either e for individuals or v for events. This
gives it the type of a modifier. In Champollion (2015a), I use slight variations of
(23) to redefine the atomic and nonatomic distributivity operators originally
introduced in Link (1987) and Schwarzschild (1996). I argue there that they are
modifiers as well, just like adverbial each and similar items in other languages,
which can be analyzed in terms of these operators (Champollion 2015b). It is
encouraging that the reformulation in (23) brings stratified reference even closer
to these operators and items.
The original formulation, which we may call universal stratified reference,
will still be useful for various purposes, such as the formulation of meaning
postulates like (52) in the target article. We can retrieve it from the definition in
(23) as follows:
(24) Universal stratified reference
SRf ;g ¼def λP"x½PðxÞ ! SR f ;gðPÞðxÞ
(P has stratified reference with dimension f and granularity g iff P stratifies
everything in P.)
In (23) and (24), I have written the granularity parameter simply as g. We could
instantiate it as εðKÞ to obtain the original formulation in the article. But
Schwarzschild and Piñón suggest that it may be that all that is required for a
for-adverbial to be felicitous is that there be at least two distinct, or perhaps
disjoint, subevents (cf. Kratzer 2007). One of the examples Schwarzschild uses to
illustrate his claim involves a slow-walking robot who “walks for four minutes”
by starting with a two-minute step followed by two minutes of normal walking.
This is analogous to Doetjes’ example (3b), in which twelve pounds of weights
describes boxes that each contain a ten-pound weight and two one-pound
weights, and to Link’s example (8), in which two airplanes are produced during
a six-month span.
Schwarzschild’s restricted formulation of stratified reference can be used to
capture this if we instantiate g in (23) with λh:h< f ðxÞ, where < is overloaded to
denote the proper-part relation over individuals or events as well as the less-
than relation over degrees.
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(25) λPλx x 2 λy PðyÞ ^
f ðyÞ< f ðxÞ
  
(x consists of one or more parts in P that are each less than x on the scale
determined by f.)
There is a price to pay for swapping εðKÞ for < in this way, as Schwarzschild
notes: We no longer account for the gradual decrease in acceptability shown in
Bale’s and Zweig’s squishes, reported as (46) and (48) in the article. Perhaps a
different account can be given in terms of speaker knowledge along the lines of
Doetjes’ suggestion, as I discussed in Section 2. I leave this problem open for
future investigation, and turn to revising the entries for the words for, each, and
all provided in the target article.
(26) [ for] ¼ λτhviiλMhitiλPhvtiλe : SR τ;λh:h< τðeÞðPÞðeÞ: PðeÞ ^MðτðeÞÞ
(27) [[each (of the) NP]] = λPλe : SRagent; Atom ðPÞðeÞ:½PðeÞ^ agentðeÞ ¼ ¯ NP 
(28) [[all the NP]] = λPλe : SRagent; λx:x< agentðeÞ ðPÞðeÞ:½PðeÞ^agentðeÞ ¼ ¯ NP 
The article did not suggest an explicit lexical entry that checks stratified
reference in pseudopartitives. I assume that the presuppositions of pseudoparti-
tives are contributed by of, which combines with a silent measure function μ,
then with the substance noun N and finally with the measure phrase M. For
clarity, I have labeled the entry in (29) with the types that are appropriate for
ordinary pseudopartitives. The actual entry must be type-polymorphic in order
to accommodate event-based pseudopartitives, for which the types would be as
in (26).
(29) [of ] ¼ λμhediλNhetiλMhdtiλx : SR μ;λd:d< μðxÞðPÞðxÞ: NðxÞ ^MðμðxÞÞ
The following formulas describe in schematic form some sample presuppositions
generated by these entries. All of them concern a single event or individual—
informally speaking, the one that the construction is about—rather than every
entity in the denotation of the relevant predicate:
(30) Presupposition of a temporal for-adverbial:
e 2 λe0 VPðe
0Þ ^
τðe0Þ< τðeÞ
 
(The event e in question can be divided into VPing events whose runtime is
shorter than its own.)
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(31) Presupposition of an ordinary pseudopartitive:
x 2 λy SNðyÞ ^
μðyÞ< μðxÞ
 
(The substance amount x in question can be divided into parts in the
denotation of the substance noun (SN) which are smaller than the whole
as measured by the appropriate measure function μ.)
(32) Presupposition of each in agent position:
e 2 λe0 VPðe
0Þ ^
Atomðagentðe0ÞÞ
 
(The event e in question can be divided into VPing events whose agents
are atoms.)
(33) Presupposition of all in agent position:
e 2 λe0 VPðe
0Þ ^
agentðe0Þ< agentðeÞ
 
(The event e in question can be divided into VPing events whose agents
are proper parts of its own.)
Predicates like numerous and heavy are incompatible with all, setting aside
distributive interpretations that may arise from silent distributivity operators
(see Champollion 2010: Ch. 9):
(34) a. *All the students who came to the rally are numerous. (Kroch 1974)
b. *All the water is heavy. (Dobrovie-Sorin 2014)
This can be explained by the presupposition in (33), if these predicates are
analyzed formally as quantized predicates. As I discussed in my reply to
Doetjes, a similar analysis is needed for predicates like line, twig, some milk,
and quantity of milk. How exactly to ensure this, while preventing other pre-
dicates like milk, towards the store, and gather from being treated as quantized,
is an important open problem (cf. Zucchi and White 2001).
As Piñón notes, the target article does not explicitly spell out how to apply
stratified reference to examples involvingmass quantification such as (34b) and (35).
(35) All the milk is sour. (Dobrovie-Sorin 2014)
As with the other examples in this section I use Schwarzschild’s restricted
version of stratified reference. One of the advantages of this version is that
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there is no need to invoke cardinality in the definition of count-based all, and
consequently there is no need to decide what measure function should substi-
tute for cardinality in the case of mass-based all. As is already the case for other
stative examples like the children are numerous, I assume that e ranges over
states as well as events. I assume that lexical cumulativity applies to sour, that
is, it denotes a set of sour states that is closed under sum. Somewhat arbitrarily,
I write theme for the function that maps a state of an entity’s being sour to that
entity.
(36) All the milk is sour.
Satisfied presupposition: SRtheme; λx:x< theme ðeÞðλe0:sourðe0ÞÞðeÞ ,
e 2 λe0 sourðe
0Þ ^
themeðe0Þ< themeðeÞ
 
(The sourness state in question can be divided into sourness states whose
themes are proper parts of its own.)
This constraint is presumably what requires the predicate in the nuclear scope of
mass quantification with all to be homogeneous (see Dobrovie-Sorin (2014) and
references therein):
(37) *All the water weighs one ton.
Failed presupposition: SRtheme; λx:x< theme ðeÞðλe0:e0 2[weighs one ton]ÞðeÞ ,
e 2 λe0 e
0 2 [weighs one ton] ^
themeðe0Þ< themeðeÞ
 
(The weighing-one-ton state in question can be divided into weighing-
one-ton states whose themes are proper parts of its own.)
7 Conclusion
My target article proposed stratified reference as a formalization of unbounded-
ness in natural language, and as a way to characterize various semantic opposi-
tions involving atelicity, plurality and mass reference, extensive measure
functions, distributivity, and collectivity. I suggested that several constructions
impose analogous stratified-reference constraints, instantiated with different
parameter values. The comments on my article have changed my thinking
about the best way to formalize stratified reference. I have followed some of
Piñón’s and Schwarzschild’s suggestions and relativized it to the parts of the
event or individual in question. This takes stratified reference a step away from,
and perhaps ahead of, well-known properties such as cumulative or divisive
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reference. I have also followed another suggestion to replace the predicate εðKÞ,
which I had never fully defined in the first place, by a simpler one based on < ,
and I instantiated the granularity parameter of stratified reference accordingly.
The commentators deserve credit for suggesting these modifications and I am
grateful to them for engaging in this debate. I am sure that not all of them will
agree with the conclusions I have drawn from it. Still, I hope that the result is a
useful synthesis of the debate in this volume and a stable basis for future theory-
building.
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